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MONTANA CANNABIS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION V. STATE
OF MONTANA AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Thomas J. Bourguignon*

“But the wise know that foolish legislation is a rope of sand, which perishes
in the twisting; that the State must follow, and not lead the character and
progress of the citizen; . . . and that the form of government which prevails, is
the expression of what cultivation exists in the population which permits it.
The law is only a memorandum.”
—Ralph Waldo Emerson1

I.

INTRODUCTION

This note tells the story of two laws, both of them bad. In 2011, the
Montana legislature attempted to fix an overly-permissive 2004 law allowing for the use of medical marijuana. Unfortunately, the new law, like
its predecessor, was a “rope of sand.” In Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State of Montana (MCIA),2 the Supreme Court of Montana upheld
the constitutionality of the 2011 statute that restricted the activities of medical marijuana providers and registered cardholders.3 The Court reversed the
district court and held that the State’s exercise of police power to regulate
for the public health and safety did not implicate the plaintiffs’ rights under
the Montana Constitution.4 The Court also chose not to dismiss the case for
lack of justiciability despite the appearance of a direct conflict with the
federal Controlled Substances Act.5
This note argues that the Court failed to analyze the legal issues in
sufficient detail and that, if it had done so, it would likely have enjoined
crucial portions of the 2011 statute. Section II provides background on federal and state laws regarding the use of marijuana. Section III offers a summary of the trial court’s decision to enjoin specific provisions in the statute
and the Court’s decision in MCIA to reverse the trial court. Section IV of* Thomas J. Bourguignon, Candidate for J.D. 2015, the University of Montana School of Law.
The author is grateful to Gail, Felix, and Woody for their loving support. The author thanks Professor
Anthony Johnstone for his thought-provoking comments and careful reading. Additional thanks to
Henry Bourguignon, Helena Maclay, and Montana Law Review editors and staff for their thorough and
insightful contributions.
1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Politics, in The Annotated Emerson 248, 250 (David Mikics ed., The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2012).
2. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn. v. State, 286 P.3d 1161 (Mont. 2012).
3. Id. at 1163.
4. Id. at 1165–1168.
5. Id. at 1169–1170 (Nelson, J., dissenting).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2014

1

Montana Law Review, Vol. 75 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 7
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\75-1\MON105.txt

168

unknown

Seq: 2

7-FEB-14

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

12:39

Vol. 75

fers a critical analysis of the majority opinion and the dissent in MCIA and
argues that the Court was incorrect in its analysis of the state constitutional
issues although it was correct not to dismiss the matter because of federal
preemption of the state law.
II. BACKGROUND

ON

LAWS REGULATING MARIJUANA

The history of marijuana use in America tends to coincide with societal concerns about the culture, or counterculture, surrounding marijuana.6
Scientific studies regarding the effects of marijuana tend to support the polemical positions of special interests, either marijuana advocates or opponents.7 This section will summarize three historical stages in the relationship between marijuana and American law and culture.
A. Early Regulation of Marijuana
According to one historian of drugs and alcohol, “the practice of
smoking cannabis leaves arrived in the United States with Mexican immigrants, who had come north during the 1920s to work in agriculture, and
extended to white and black jazz musicians.”8 With the onset of Prohibition
in 1920, increasing numbers of Americans began to consume marijuana instead of alcohol.9 During the Great Depression, immigrants “became an unwelcome minority linked with violence and with growing and smoking marijuana.”10
Marijuana was regulated as early as the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act,
which required products containing marijuana to include a label showing
the quantity of the drug.11 In the 1920s and 1930s, some western states,
wary of immigrants, urged the federal government to regulate marijuana.12
The states then promulgated laws restricting marijuana use; by 1937, every
6. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Victor G. Haddox, & Alex Kreit, Drug Abuse and the Law Sourcebook:
2012–2013 Edition, Vol. 1, 307–309 (West 2012) (observing the “clear-cut separation” in American
thought, both public and professional, between “alcohol and tobacco on the one hand, and ‘narcotics’ on
the other. Use of alcohol and tobacco were indigenous American practices. The intoxicant use of narcotics was not native, however, and the users of these drugs were either alien . . . or perceived to be
marginal members of society.”).
7. Richard E. Isralowitz & Peter L. Meyers, Illicit Drugs, 17 (Greenwood 2011).
8. David F. Musto, M.D., Drugs in America: A Documentary History, 189 (New York University
Press 2002). Before the 1920s, cannabis existed in America in the form of hashish. Id. at 405–406.
9. Edward M. Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs, 410 (Little, Brown & Company 1972).
10. Musto, supra n. 8, at 189.
11. Michael Berkey, Student Author, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal
Tango, 9 Cardozo Publ. L. Policy & Ethics J. 417, 423 (2011).
12. Musto, supra n. 8, at 189–190.
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state had restricted marijuana use.13 A federal statutory scheme designed to
deter marijuana use, the Marihuana Tax Act, was passed in 1937.14 In 1941,
cannabis was removed from the U.S. Pharmacopeia.15 In 1951 Congress
created mandatory minimum penalties for violations of the Marihuana Tax
Act, and in 1956 the Narcotic Control Act increased the penalties.16
B. Systematic Federal Action
In 1969 the United States Supreme Court held the Marihuana Tax Act
unconstitutional.17 As recreational marijuana use increased substantially
during the 1960s, particularly among young people, President Nixon came
to view marijuana use as part of the “moral decay in American society.”18
In an effort to reduce this sense of moral decay, the president declared a
“war on drugs.”19 Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CSA), replacing previous drug laws
with a comprehensive regulatory scheme.20 President Nixon created a National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse in 1971 to undertake an
extensive study of the use of marijuana and make recommendations for
federal policy.21 The committee’s report, Marijuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, concluded that marijuana use was not dangerous and should be
decriminalized.22
The CSA divides drugs into five schedules.23 Schedule I drugs are the
most restricted.24 A Schedule I drug is considered to have a “high potential
for abuse,” has “no currently accepted medical use,” and is not safe to use
under medical supervision.25 Marijuana is a Schedule I drug.26 The federal
13. Uelmen et al., supra n. 6, at 309. The states did not all act on their own initiative. In 1932 the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted “an optional marihuana provision” in its Uniform National Drug Act, and many states adopted that provision.
14. Musto, supra n. 8, at 190. Employing Congress’ tax power as a means of prohibition, the
Marihuana Tax Act allowed transfers of marihuana by paying a $1 per ounce tax for anyone registered
under the Act; however, those unregistered under the Act were required to pay a $100 per ounce tax. Id.
at 430–432.
15. Berkey, supra n. 11, at 425.
16. Id. at 425–426.
17. Leary v. U.S., 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
18. Berkey, supra n. 11, at 426.
19. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).
20. Uelmen et al., supra n. 6, at 3.
21. Id. at 307.
22. Musto, supra n. 8, at 460.
23. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a) (2013).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and
the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421, 1433 (2009).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).
26. Mikos, supra n. 24, at 1433. Mikos compares the “seriousness of this classification” to cocaine
and methamphetamine, both of which are on Schedule II. Id. at 1433 n. 49.
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ban on marijuana has survived attempts at moving the drug to a less-restricted schedule as well as attempts at challenging the constitutionality of
the determination to place marijuana on Schedule I.27
The war on drugs caused a “decline in favorable attitudes toward marijuana that began in the late 1970s” and continued into the twenty-first century.28 One scholarly study summarized America’s attitude toward the war
on drugs:
An analysis of 47 national surveys conducted from 1978 to 1997 on what
Americans think about the war on drugs was published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association. The conclusion over that time period was that
Americans do not think the war has succeeded but they don’t want to give up
on the efforts. Furthermore, they believe illicit drug use is a moral rather than
public health issue, and there is weak support for increasing funding for drug
treatment.29

C. Medical Marijuana and State Laws
In 1996 California voters approved Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), making California the first state since the passage of
the CSA to permit the use of marijuana for medical purposes.30 The CUA
ensures “patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not
subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.”31
Since the passage of the CUA, a number of other states have legalized
medical marijuana. At the time of this writing, twenty states and the District
of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana.32 Most of these states require the medical marijuana user be diagnosed with a debilitating medical
condition and a physician recommend marijuana for the patient.33 Some
27. Id. at 1436–1437. Mikos cites Gonzales v. Raich as a leading case in which plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate marijuana produced and consumed for medical purposes within a single state.
28. Musto, supra n. 8, at 190–191.
29. Isralowitz & Meyers, supra n. 7, at 43–44.
30. Uelman et al., supra n. 6, at 377; Mikos, supra n. 24, at 1427–1428.
31. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (2013).
32. Procon.org, 20 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C.: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last updated Sept. 16,
2013). The relevant statutes for these twenty states and the District of Columbia are as follows: Alaska
Stat. § 17.37.010 (Lexis 2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36–2801 (West 2011); Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 11362.5 (2011); Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a–253 (2011); D.C. Code
§ 7–1671.01 (West 2011); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4901A (Lexis 2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329–121
(2012); 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 130/1 (2013); 22 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2421 (2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
94C App. § 1–1 (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.26421 (2012); Mont. Code Ann. § 50–46–301
(2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453A.010 (2011); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126–X:1 (West 2013); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 24:6I–1 (West 2011); N.M. Stat. § 26–2B–1 (2012); Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.300 (2011); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 21–28.6–1 (2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4472 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 69.51A.005 (2012).
33. Mikos, supra n. 24, at 1428.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol75/iss1/7

R
R
R

R

4

Bourguignon: Montana Cannabis Industry Association
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\75-1\MON105.txt

2014

unknown

Seq: 5

7-FEB-14

MONTANA CANNABIS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

12:39

171

states require medical marijuana users to provide the state a signed form
from their physician to become a registered marijuana user.34 In many
states, a permit to possess and use medical marijuana functions as an affirmative defense for state criminal charges relating to use or possession of
the drug.35
State laws regarding medical marijuana continue to evolve rapidly. At
the time of this writing, four states have pending legislation to legalize medical marijuana.36 Two states with medical marijuana programs already in
place, Colorado and Washington, passed voter initiatives in 2012 to legalize
marijuana for recreational use.37 It remains to be seen what legal challenges
or changes in social views of marijuana will emerge from those states’ full
legalization of marijuana.38
III. MONTANA CANNABIS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION V. STATE
OF MONTANA
A. Factual and Procedural History
When the State of Montana passed a comprehensive drug law in 1969,
it included marijuana as a “dangerous drug,” thus prohibiting the use or
possession of marijuana.39 Marijuana remained illegal for all uses until
2004, when almost 62% of Montana voters supported I–148, a statewide
ballot initiative approving the legalization of medical marijuana.40 The resulting law, the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act (the 2004 MMA), allowed
“qualifying patients” with certain health conditions to obtain a permit to
grow, possess, and use marijuana for medical purposes, provided that they
34. Id. at 1428–1429.
35. Id. at 1430.
36. Procon.org, Four States with Pending Legislation to Legalize Medical Marijuana, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=002481 (last updated Aug. 1, 2013). The website also lists three states with laws “favorable towards medical marijuana” but do not actually legalize
its use; and thirteen states where proposed medical marijuana legislation failed.
37. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16; Wash. Rev. Code § 69.51A.005; Niraj Chokshi, GovBeat, After
legalizing marijuana, Washington and Colorado are starting to regulate it, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/10/09/after-legalizing-marijuana-washington-and-colorado-are-starting-toregulate-it/ (Oct. 9, 2013, 10:48 a.m.).
38. On August 29, 2013, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole released a memorandum that in
effect announces a policy of deprioritization of enforcement of the CSA in Colorado and Washington.
Memo. From James M. Cole, Dep. Atty. Gen. for U.S. Dept of Just., to all U.S. Attys., Memo. for All
U.S. Attys., Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) (available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf).
39. 1969 Mont. Laws 765–766.
40. Amend. Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief at 2, Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn v. State of Montana,
http://legaldocs.mtcia.org/Complaint%20for%20Declatry%20&%20Injnctv%20Relief.pdf (Mont. Dist.
June 15, 2011).
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could obtain written notice from a physician.41 The 2004 MMA allowed
medical marijuana “caregivers” to assist qualifying patients42 and prohibited any prosecution or penalization of physicians for providing certification
for qualifying patients.43 The 2004 MMA placed no restriction on the number of qualifying patients a single caregiver could assist.44 The 2004 MMA
was short and strikingly general.45
For the next several years, enrollment in the medical marijuana permitting program was relatively low.46 Then in 2009, the U.S. Department of
Justice released a policy statement (the “Ogden Memorandum”) that implied the federal government would deprioritize the enforcement of its drug
laws with respect to marijuana in those states in which medical marijuana
laws had been passed.47 Perhaps as a result of the Ogden Memorandum,
medical marijuana caregivers ramped up their operations, and the number
of qualifying patients in Montana’s medical marijuana program expanded at
an alarming rate.48 By the middle of 2010, Montana had almost 20,000
qualifying patients and almost 4,000 registered caregivers.49
The legislature’s first attempt in 2011 at amending the 2004 MMA was
House Bill 161, which simply repealed I–148 and the 2004 MMA.50 House
Bill 161 passed and was vetoed by Governor Brian Schweitzer.51 Senate
Bill 423, which repealed the 2004 MMA and replaced it with a new statu41. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50–46–102 to 103 (2005); Br. of Appellant, Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn.
v. State of Montana, 2011 WL 5893859 at 3–4 (Mont. Nov. 16, 2011) (DA 11–0460).
42. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50–46–102(1)(a), 103(4) (2005).
43. Id. at § 50–46–201(4).
44. Id. at §§ 50–46–102 to 210.
45. Id.
46. State’s Memo. Opposing Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn. v. State of
Montana, 2011 WL 3626008 at 3 (Mont. Dist. June 3, 2011) (DDV–2011–518). It was only in 2008 that
the program reached 1,000 registered cardholders.
47. Memo. from David W. Ogden, Dep. Atty. Gen. for the U.S. Dept. of Just., to Selected U.S.
Attys., Memo. for Selected U.S. Attys., Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Med.
Use of Marijuana (Oct 19, 2009) (available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf). This memorandum was clarified in 2011 by another memorandum due to the “increase in the
scope of commercial cultivation” of medical marijuana. Memo. from James M. Cole, Dep. Atty. Gen.
for U.S. Dept. of Just., to U.S. Attys., Memo. for U.S. Attys., Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in
Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Med. Use at 1–2 (June 29, 2011) (available at http://
www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf).
48. Br. of Appellant, supra n. 41, at 4–5.
49. State’s Memo. Opposing Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra n. 46, at 4.
50. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1163. Interestingly, on March 14, 2011, the same day that Montana’s House Judiciary Committee considered HB–161, federal law enforcement raided a number of
medical marijuana facilities that were operating legally under the 2004 MMA. Emilie Ritter, Federal
Agents Raid Montana Medical Marijuana Facilities, Reuters (March 14, 2011) (available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/03/15/us-montana-marijuana-idUSTRE72E0O520110315).
51. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1163.
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tory framework, passed and became law (the 2011 MMA) on May 14, 2011
without the Governor’s signature.52
The 2011 MMA—significantly longer and more specific than the 2004
MMA—allows “registered cardholders” to use marijuana for medical purposes, but it sharply limits the eligibility of many individuals who would
have been registered as qualifying patients under the 2004 MMA, as well as
limiting the activities of medical marijuana “Providers.”53 Some of the most
significant provisions of the 2011 MMA include the following limitations:
(1) “severe chronic pain” was defined more specifically and requires “objective proof” such as x-rays or MRI images;54 (2) physicians who certify
25 or more patients in a 12-month period are subject to review by the Montana Board of Medical Examiners;55 (3) Providers may only assist up to
three registered cardholders;56 (4) Providers may not charge any fee beyond
the fees required for registered cardholders to apply for or renew their registration cards;57 (5) state law enforcement is permitted to conduct “unannounced inspections” of the premises where Providers grow marijuana for
registered cardholders;58 and (6) advertising of marijuana-related products
are prohibited in any medium.59
Shortly before the 2011 MMA became law, the Montana Cannabis Industry Association and other caregivers and qualifying patients initiated the
present lawsuit against the State, alleging the 2011 MMA was unconstitutional under the Montana Constitution.60 The plaintiffs moved the district
court to both temporarily and permanently enjoin the entire 2011 MMA,
arguing the 2011 MMA would have the effect of denying registered cardholders access to medical marijuana.61 The State argued individuals do not
have a fundamental right to possess or use marijuana free from state regulation.62 Shortly after the 2011 MMA passed into law, the Montana Cannabis
Industry Association began the second prong of its attack against the law: it
prepared a statewide veto referendum, IR–124 to appear upon the Novem52. State’s Memo. Opposing Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra n. 46, at 5.
53. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1163–1164; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50–46–301 to 303 (2011). The
2011 MMA replaces the term “caregivers” with “providers” and replaces “qualifying patient” with “registered cardholder.” Mont. Code Ann. § 50–46–302 (2011).
54. Mont. Code Ann. § 50–46–302(2)(c) (2011).
55. Id. at § 50–46–303(10).
56. Id. at § 50–46–308(3)(a)(i).
57. Id. at § 50–46–308(4), (6).
58. Id. at § 50–46–329(1).
59. Id. at § 50–46–341.
60. Amend. Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief, supra n. 40, at 20–21.
61. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1163; Amend. Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief, supra n. 40, at
18–19.
62. State’s Memo. Opposing Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra n. 46, at 7.
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ber 2012 ballot asking voters whether the 2004 MMA should be replaced
by the 2011 MMA.63
On June 30, 2011, the district court issued an order for preliminary
injunction that largely followed the plaintiffs’ manner of framing the case
and enjoined the following: the ban on advertising, the provisions on inspection, the provision requiring review of physicians who recommend marijuana to 25 or more patients, the provision prohibiting Providers from assisting more than three registered cardholders, and the provision prohibiting
Providers from charging fees for their services.64 The plaintiffs appealed,
arguing that the district court erred in not enjoining the 2011 MMA in its
entirety.65 The State of Montana also appealed, arguing the district court
erred in applying strict scrutiny analysis because the plaintiffs’ fundamental
rights were not implicated by the 2011 MMA.66
In their appellate briefs, the plaintiffs continued their approach of asserting that the 2011 MMA infringed a number of rights protected in the
Montana Constitution and that the State was wrong to frame the case as a
question of whether a fundamental right to medical marijuana exists.67 The
State reiterated the need for a tougher law due to a number of problems (the
“Widespread Abuses”) that had arisen under the more-relaxed 2004
MMA.68 The State focused its argument narrowly around three rights: the
right to pursue employment, the right to seek health, and the right to privacy.69 It argued that because these rights were not infringed, the lower

63. Montana Secretary of State, Initiative Referendum No. IR–124, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/
Archives/2010s/2012/Initiatives/IR-124.asp (accessed Oct. 17, 2013). On November 6, 2012, IR–124
passed by a margin of 68,000 votes, or about 57% in favor, meaning that voters approved the repeal of
the 2004 MMA and its replacement by the 2011 MMA. Montana Secretary of State, 2012 Statewide
General Election Canvass, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/2012/2012_General_Canvass.pdf, 27 (accessed
Oct. 17, 2013).
64. Or. on Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn. v. State of Montana, http://legaldocs.
mtcia.org/judge-decision-2011-06-30.pdf at 15 (Mont. Dist. June 30, 2011).
65. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1164.
66. Id.
67. Appellee’s Response and Cross-App. Br., Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn. v. State of Montana,
2012 WL 28772 at 28–32 (Mont. Jan. 17, 2012) (DA 11–0460).
68. Br. of Appellant, supra n. 41, at 4–5. The Widespread Abuses are as follows: the alarming
growth in the number of registered cardholders (there were 30,000 registered cardholders by the time of
the 2011 legislature); large-scale commercial grow operations; proliferation of storefront operations selling marijuana; traveling “medical clinics” that would register hundreds of cardholders in a single day;
registered cardholders smoking marijuana in public; large numbers of probationers receiving medical
marijuana cards; the large numbers (almost 30% of all cardholders) of otherwise-healthy 18 to 30 yearolds becoming registered cardholders due to “chronic pain”; and the Board of Medical Examiners’
concern that some physicians had recommended marijuana without “establishing a bona fide doctorpatient relationship, or otherwise conducting appropriate medical examinations.”
69. Id. at 12–21.
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court erred in applying strict scrutiny review rather than rational basis review.70
A brief remark regarding levels of judicial scrutiny is warranted.
Under the Montana Constitution, the State has broad police powers to pass
laws that are rationally related to the State’s goals, as long as no rights are
infringed. When a fundamental right included in the Montana Constitution’s Declaration of Rights is implicated by a statute, courts will use “strict
scrutiny” analysis.71 Under strict scrutiny analysis, the State “has the burden of showing the law . . . is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.”72 “Middle-tier scrutiny” involves a balancing test and
is applied if an implicated right appears in the Montana Constitution but not
within the Declaration of Rights.73 The “rational basis” test is the least demanding of the three levels of scrutiny. It is applicable when neither strict
scrutiny nor middle-tier scrutiny apply.74 Under this test, a law need only be
“rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”75 The rational basis
test as applied to the Montana Constitution thus raises a troubling question:
if a statute does not infringe the Declaration of Rights in the Montana Constitution, and it does not infringe any other part of the Montana Constitution, then what rights, if any, have been infringed; and if no rights have
been infringed, why would courts even impose rational basis analysis?76
B. Majority Holding
Following the State’s manner of framing its argument, the Court considered whether the 2011 MMA implicated the rights to pursue employment, seek health, and privacy.77 In a six to one decision, the Court held the
2011 MMA did not implicate any of the three rights and remanded the case
to the district court with instructions to decide the matter by applying rational basis review.78 The Court declined to consider the plaintiffs’ claim on
appeal that the 2011 MMA should be enjoined in its entirety.79
70. Id. at 12–21. Interestingly, the State did not attempt to argue that the 2011 MMA could survive
strict scrutiny review because it had a compelling interest in curbing the Widespread Abuses.
71. Snetsinger v. Mont. U. System, 104 P.3d 445, 449–450 (Mont. 2004).
72. Id. at 450 (citation omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. This question was raised in conversation by Professor Anthony Johnstone. Conversation with
Anthony Johnstone, Asst. Prof. of L., Univ. of Mont. Sch. of L. (Oct. 8, 2013).
77. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1164.
78. Id. at 1163, 1168.
79. Id. at 1168.
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1. Right to Pursue Employment
In a brief analysis, the Court considered the plaintiffs’ argument that
the 2011 MMA implicated the right of Providers to pursue employment.80
The Court followed its decision in Wadsworth v. State81 in asserting that,
although the “right to the opportunity to pursue employment” is not expressly included in Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution, it is a
fundamental right because it is “a right without which other constitutionally
guaranteed rights would have little meaning.”82
At the urging of the State, the Court chose to follow its decision in
Wiser v. State,83 in which the plaintiff denturists challenged a regulation
that required denturists to refer partial-denture patients to a dentist before
performing the partial denture procedure.84 The Wiser court distinguished
Wadsworth v. State—in which the plaintiff was “completely proscribed”
from outside work—from Wiser, where denturists “remain free to pursue
denture work generally.”85 The Wiser Court also held the right to pursue
employment does not extend to a right to pursue employment free of the
exercise of the State’s police power, in particular because Article II, Section
3 of the Montana Constitution expressly includes the limitation “in all lawful ways.”86
In the present case, the Court followed Wiser and held that the phrase
“in all lawful ways” used in Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution circumscribed the right to pursue employment “by subjecting it to the
State’s police power to protect the public health and welfare.”87 The Court
held that individuals “do not have a fundamental right to pursue a particular employment” and that medical marijuana Providers, “who are ultimately
horticulturalists, remain free to pursue horticulture work generally.”88 Because the fundamental right to pursue employment was not implicated, the
Court held that the lower court erred when it applied strict scrutiny analysis
instead of the rational basis test.89
80. Id. at 1165–1166.
81. Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165 (Mont. 1996).
82. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1165 (citing Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1172). In Wadsworth the
Court held that a regulation prohibiting state real estate appraisers from seeking outside employment
infringed the appraisers’ right to pursue employment and that the State failed to show a compelling
interest for infringing that right. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1174.
83. Wiser v. State, 129 P.3d 133 (Mont. 2006).
84. Id. at 136.
85. Id. at 139.
86. Id.
87. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1166.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1166.
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2. Right to Seek Health
In an even shorter analysis, the Court considered the plaintiffs’ argument that the 2011 MMA implicated the right of registered cardholders to
seek health.90 The Court spent little time on this issue and held that, although an individual has a “fundamental right to obtain and reject medical
treatment . . . this right does not extend to give a patient a fundamental right
to use any drug, regardless of its legality.”91 The Court asserted that no
courts in other jurisdictions have “acceded to this type of affirmative access
claim.”92 Again, the Court held that the lower court erred when it applied
strict scrutiny analysis instead of the rational basis test.93
3. Right to Privacy
The plaintiffs urged the Court to follow its decision in Armstrong v.
State,94 in which health care providers sued to enjoin a law requiring certain
abortions to be performed by physicians and not physicians’ assistants.95 In
Armstrong the Court issued a strong statement upholding an individual’s
right to privacy to obtain a medical procedure: “The legislature has no interest, much less a compelling one, to justify its interference with an individual’s fundamental privacy right to obtain a particular lawful medical procedure from a health care provider that has been determined by the medical
community to be competent to provide that service.”96
In 2006, the plaintiffs in Wiser argued unsuccessfully that the Court
should follow Andrews v. Ballard,97 in which a Texas court held that the
decision to obtain acupuncture treatment is encompassed by the right to
privacy and that a state law requiring the licensing of acupuncturists was
unconstitutional.98 The Wiser court concluded that following Andrews
90. Id. at 1166–1167.
91. Id. at 1166 (citation omitted).
92. Id. (citing Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Footnote 18 to Abigail Alliance lists eight additional federal cases in
which constitutional claims of affirmative access to a particular treatment or particular medicine were
denied. The analysis of the constitutional claim in Abigail Alliance is almost as brief as in MCIA and
concludes that because there is no constitutional right to a particular medical treatment, the government
“reasonably prohibited” the medical treatment in question. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 711. The dissent in Abigail makes a spirited and forceful argument that the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects the fundamental “right to save one’s life,” thus requiring a showing of a compelling state interest for any regulation of medications. Id. at 715–728.
93. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1166–1167.
94. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
95. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1167 (citing Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 371–372).
96. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 380.
97. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
98. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 137 (citing Andrews, 498 F. Supp. at 1057). According to the Wiser Court,
Andrews was cited in Armstrong only for the “general proposition that individuals have the right to
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would force the State to “shoulder the burden of demonstrating that no less
restrictive set of qualifications for a license could serve the State’s interest
in protecting the health of its citizens.”99
In MCIA the Court indicated that its decision in Wiser narrowed its
holding in Armstrong: “It does not necessarily follow from the existence of
the right to privacy that every restriction on medical care impermissibly
infringes that right.”100 The Court held that the right to privacy “does not
encompass the affirmative right of access to medical marijuana” and declined to apply strict scrutiny.101
C. Justice Nelson’s Dissent
Justice Nelson divided his dissent into two sections. In the first part, he
diverged from the majority opinion because he believed the case did not
present a “justiciable controversy.”102 Under the Montana Constitution,
courts are not authorized to issue advisory opinions.103 Montana courts are
to make a threshold determination whether a case is justiciable.104 A justiciable controversy must involve “legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,” and it must allow “specific relief . . . as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts,
or upon an abstract proposition.”105
Justice Nelson opined that the controversy was not justiciable because
Montana’s law permitting the use of medical marijuana is in violation of the
federal Controlled Substances Act.106 According to Justice Nelson, the
plaintiffs claimed “they have a fundamental right under the Montana Constitution to engage in conduct which is criminal under federal law.”107 The
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires state law to
obtain and reject medical treatment” and not for Andrews’ holding that a fundamental right exists “to
obtain medical care from professionals who have not been determined by the regulating authority to be
qualified.” Wiser, 129 P.3d at 137 (citing Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 379 n. 8).
99. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 138 (citation omitted).
100. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1167 (citing Wiser, 129 P.3d at 137).
101. Id. at 1168. To support its conclusion that individuals do not have an affirmative right to access
specific drugs, the court cited cases from other jurisdictions, including: (1) Cal. v. Privitera, 591 P.2d
919 (Cal. 1979) (no right to obtain drugs that have not been approved for sale); (2) Carnohan v. U.S.,
616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (rational basis review used because no right exists to obtain an
experimental drug “free of the lawful exercise of government police power”); and (3) Co. of Santa Cruz
v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (enforcement of the CSA against individuals
seeking to use medical marijuana denied plaintiffs a “specific type of treatment,” not the “right to treatment generally”).
102. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1169 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (citing Mont. Const. art VII, § 4(1)).
104. Id. at 1169.
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801).
107. Id. at 1170.
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yield to federal law if “compliance with both federal and state regulations is
a physical impossibility.”108 The present case does not present a justiciable
controversy because “when Montana’s courts are asked to interpret Montana’s medical marijuana laws, they are asked, in effect, to issue an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts, or upon
an abstract proposition.”109 Justice Nelson suggested that the medical marijuana community might consider changing the federal law first so as to
avoid any conflicts with state law.110
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Nelson critiqued the majority
opinion for holding that the rational basis test should be applied to the
plaintiffs’ claims that their fundamental rights to employment, health, and
privacy were infringed.111 Justice Nelson asserted that the Court should
have applied strict scrutiny, because the plaintiffs’ claims arose under those
fundamental rights: “Strict scrutiny applies to an alleged infringement of a
fundamental right . . . . Here, plaintiffs’ claims are premised on Article II,
Sections 3 and 10 . . . . We do not apply rational-basis review to legislation
which regulates the exercise of a fundamental right.”112 Justice Nelson then
critiqued the majority opinion for expanding the Court’s decision in Wiser
and reading the State’s police power even more forcefully into the Montana
Constitution’s Declaration of Rights.113 He disagreed with the majority
opinion’s “proposition that the parameters of the Article II, Section 3 rights
are dictated, circumscribed, or trumped by the State’s police power.”114
Section IV of this note proposes an analytical framework similar to the
analysis in Justice Nelson’s dissent.115

108. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1170 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Ariz. v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012)).
109. Id. at 1171 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 1172.
111. Id. at 1172–1173.
112. Id. at 1172 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Justice Nelson appears to be saying strict
scrutiny analysis should have been applied merely because the plaintiffs alleged that their rights were
infringed, not because the Court found that the plaintiffs’ rights actually were infringed.
113. Id. at 1173.
114. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1173 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
115. That analytical framework requires asking, first, “whether the constitutional provisions upon
which plaintiffs rely include the rights they claim.” Id. at 1172. Second, it asks whether “a statute or
administrative regulation implicates a fundamental right.” Id. Third, if the first two questions have been
answered in the affirmative, the Court applies strict scrutiny. Id. The majority opinion in effect asked the
first question and concluded that the rights were circumscribed by the state’s police power. The majority
then avoided the second question altogether and concluded strict scrutiny was not appropriate. Id. at
1166–1168.
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D. The Lower Court’s Decision After MCIA
Shortly after the case was remanded, the district court issued a temporary restraining order against enforcement of the provisions of the 2011
MMA that were the subject of the Court’s decision.116 Then, in January
2013, the district court issued its Order on Preliminary Injunction, in which
it applied rational basis review and still concluded that the relevant provisions of the 2011 MMA infringed on the plaintiffs’ rights under the Montana Constitution.117 The district court again followed the plaintiffs’ anecdotal framing of the argument, concluding that of the 8,404 registered cardholders as of November 2012, approximately 4,332 “would have no source
of medical marijuana” if the temporary restraining order were lifted.118 A
full trial for a permanent injunction, reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’
case, remains pending.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Montana Supreme Court’s decision in MCIA was troublingly
brief.119 The majority opinion’s primary reason—in essence its only reason—for concluding that the rights to employment, health, and privacy
were not infringed, was that the State has “police power to regulate to protect the public health and welfare.”120 As Justice Nelson indicated in his
dissent, the majority opinion did not correctly analyze the question of
whether the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights had in fact been infringed.121 By
contrast, the majority opinion in Armstrong included a thorough analysis of
the application of the right to privacy to a statute limiting a woman’s choice
of provider when obtaining an abortion.122
The majority opinion in MCIA failed to analyze a number of factors
crucial to the determination of the constitutional rights at issue in the case.
The Court should have analyzed the following issues: (A) whether the Montana Constitution does in fact confer a substantive right to employment,
health, or privacy; (B) whether the 2011 MMA actually infringed the rights
to employment and health; (C) whether the State had a compelling interest
116. Or. Granting Temp. Restraining Or., Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn. v. State of Montana, http://
www.mtcia.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Mt-Cannabis-Industry-v-State-DDV-2011-518-10-26-12Order-Granting-TRO.pdf at 6 (Mont. Dist. Oct. 26, 2012) (No. DDV–2011–518). The Temporary Restraining Order enjoined the enforcement of the 2011 MMA’s limit of three registered cardholders per
provider and the 2011 MMA’s prohibition on providers charging a fee for their services.
117. Or. on Prelim. Inj., Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn. v. State. of Montana, 2013 WL 496762 at 13
(Mont. Dist. Jan. 16, 2013) (No. DDV–2011–518).
118. Or. on Prelim. Inj., supra n. 117, at 9.
119. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1165–1168 (majority).
120. Id. at 1166 (quoting Wiser, 129 P.3d at 139) (emphasis removed).
121. Id. at 1172 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
122. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 372–383.
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in passing the 2011 MMA, and whether the 2011 MMA was narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest; and (D) whether MCIA was a
justiciable controversy.
A. The Montana Constitution recognizes substantive rights to pursue
employment and to seek health.
In 1889, Montana was authorized by an act of Congress to call a constitutional convention and submit a ratified constitution to Congress.123 A
constitutional convention was convened in 1889, a constitution was drafted,
and on November 8, 1889 the Montana Constitution went into effect.124
Article III of the 1889 Constitution, subtitled “a declaration of rights of the
people of the State of Montana,” included the following provision, which
may have been intended more as a statement of political theory than as a set
of restrictions on the power of the state:
All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness in all lawful
ways.125

In 1970 Montana citizens voted in favor of holding a constitutional
convention to revisit the text of the 1889 Montana Constitution.126 In 1972
the Montana Constitution was approved by a narrow majority of voters.127
Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution is a Declaration of Rights
and is similar to Article III, Section 3 of the 1889 Montana Constitution but
with a few significant changes, noted in italics:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the
right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life’s
basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and hap123. Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution 6 (Oxford University Press
2011).
124. Id. at 6–7.
125. Mont. Const. of 1889, art. III, § 3. It should be noted this section of the 1889 Constitution was
not drafted for Montana’s 1889 Constitution. It had been included in almost identical form in Montana’s
1884 constitution, which was not accepted by Congress for partisan political reasons. Elison & Snyder,
supra n. 123, at 5–6. The text used in 1884 had in turn been borrowed from Colorado’s 1876 Constitution. Col. Const. of 1876, art. II, 3. A century earlier, the Declaration of Independence included a similar
statement: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.” Declaration of Independence ¶ 2 (1776).
126. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 123 at 12.
127. Id. at 18. The 1972 Montana Constitution will be referred to hereinafter as the Montana Constitution.
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piness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities.128

Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution was an entirely new
addition: “The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.”129
In his dissent in MCIA, Justice Nelson asserted “this Court has held
repeatedly that the rights enumerated in Article II of the Montana Constitution . . . are fundamental constitutional rights.”130 Under the Montana Constitution, a right is considered fundamental either: (1) if it is expressly included in the Declaration of Rights, which is the entirety of Article II of the
Montana Constitution;131 or (2) although not expressly included in Article
II it is a right “without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would
have little meaning.”132 The right to seek health is expressly included in the
text of the Montana Constitution.133 The Court has held that Article II, Section 3 provides a fundamental right to pursue employment because employment is a right without which other constitutional rights would have little
meaning.134 The constitutional text includes temporizing terms that appear
to limit or qualify the scope of the right: to pursue necessities and to seek
health.135 Pursuing necessities and seeking health do not imply a right to
receive necessities or a right to health generally, which might necessitate a
substantial welfare state.136
The transcript of the 1972 Constitutional Convention provides only
hints as to the delegates’ intent. The report generated by the Bill of Rights
128. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
129. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
130. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1172 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). The right to privacy under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution will not be
further analyzed here, because it is well-established that the right to privacy is expressly included in the
Montana Constitution and that the text confers a substantive right. See generally Gryczan v. State, 942
P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) and Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364.
131. “Because Article II, Sections 3 and 10 are contained in the Declaration of Rights, it necessarily
follows that they are fundamental rights to which strict scrutiny applies.” Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at
1172 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
132. Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1984).
133. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
134. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1172 (citation omitted); Wiser, 129 P.3d at 138.
135. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 123, at 38. As indicated above, the 1889 Montana Constitution also
includes temporizing terms in stating that people have the right of “seeking and obtaining their safety
and happiness.” Mont. Const. of 1889, art. III, § 3.
136. The Bill of Rights Committee Report from the 1972 Constitutional Convention includes this
comment: “The intent of the committee on this point is not to create a substantive right for all for the
necessities of life to be provided by the public treasury.” Mont. Const. Conv. Procs. vol. II, 627 (Mont.
Legis. & Legis. Council 1972) (available at http://courts.mt.gov/library/montana_laws.mcpx). See also
Butte Comm. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311–1312 (Mont. 1985) (the Montana Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights provides no right to welfare).
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Committee includes the following note about the final sentence of Section
3:
Some [committee members] expressed the feeling that many were accepting
rights without recognizing that they create obligations. Others were adamant
that a declaration of rights should contain just that: the rights of persons
against governmental abuses and the rights of minorities against the power of
unchecked majorities. The committee felt that the inclusion of such a statement does not infringe or impair the rights granted in the declaration of
rights but only accords a tone of responsibility to their exercise.137

This comment appears to imply that the declaration of rights does indeed grant substantive rights intended to protect individuals against governmental abuses. The delegates also explained their understanding of the use
of the term inalienable: “it seems that, judging by contemporary community
standards, we’ve had no trouble in determining what . . . ‘inalienable rights’
mean.”138 Delegate Davis opined that an attempt to include a provision
prohibiting retail stores from being open on Sunday is “probably a violation
of Section 3 of the Bill of Rights . . . . It’s an infringement on the rights of
any Seventh Day Adventist who take their day off on Saturday.”139 Thus it
appears that several delegates intended Section 3 to protect substantive
rights of individuals. The Section 3 rights may be merely aspirational or
hortatory,140 or they may be substantive.141 The Court, however, has consistently been willing to find in recent years that the rights to employment
and health are substantive and fundamental rights.142
137. Mont. Const. Conv. Procs., supra n. 136, at vol. II, 627 (emphasis added).
138. Mont. Const. Conv. Procs., supra n. 136, at vol. V, 1240. Later in the transcript, a delegate
indicated that “I didn’t look it up in the dictionary; but an inalienable right is something, in my estimation, that comes to each one of us just because we’re here and we’re human beings. Even if there was no
such thing as a government, all of us would have these rights.” Mont. Const. Conv. Procs., supra n. 136
at vol. V, 1637.
139. Id. at vol. VI, 2370.
140. See Elison & Snyder, supra n. 123, at 38. Elison and Snyder note that “the generalized statement of inalienable rights [in Article II, Section 3] has not been an effective protection for individual
rights claimed in opposition to the exercise of state police power.” Further, a report prepared by the
Montana Constitutional Convention Commission had this to say: “[S]tatements of political theory are
hortatory, generally are not the subject of judicial interpretation and therefore are unenforceable.” Rick
Applegate, Bill of Rights: Constitutional Convention Study No. Ten 69 (Montana Constitutional Convention Commission 1972).
141. See e.g. James C. Nelson, Keeping Faith with the Vision: Interpreting a Constitution for This
and Future Generations, 71 Mont. L. Rev. 299, 302 (2010). Justice Nelson opposes the notion that these
rights are aspirational: “These are not simply ambitions to strive for when convenient. They are commands. They are not only mandatory, but prohibitory as well. They limit the power of the government.”
142. See Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1172 (the right to pursue life’s basic necessities, and thus the right
to pursue employment, are fundamental rights); and Simms v. Mont. Eighteenth Jud. Distr. Ct., 68 P.3d
678, 682–683 (Mont. 2003) (district court infringed on plaintiff’s right to seek health by ordering him to
attend an extensive medical examination in Oregon because the examination risked “unnecessary, painful or harmful procedures”).
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The most difficult part of determining whether Article II, Section 3
recognizes substantive rights is whether the phrase “in all lawful ways” was
intended to limit or trump the rights protected in Article II, Section 3. Ordinarily when analyzing a plaintiff’s claims that a fundamental right was infringed by a state law, the Court will follow a three-step analysis. It asks (1)
whether the right is fundamental; (2) whether the right has been infringed;
and (3) whether the State can show a compelling interest for its exercise of
police power.143 What is troubling about the use of the phrase “in all lawful
ways” is that, like the worm in the apple that consumes the whole substance, it appears to place the State’s police power within the constitutional
grant of the right. Should the phrase “in all lawful ways” allow the State to
infringe the fundamental rights without a showing of compelling interest?
A reading of Article II, Section 3 that considers “in all lawful ways” to
be surplusage is unacceptable, because all words and phrases are to be
given effect if possible.144 The phrase could be interpreted narrowly to protect individuals’ conduct only if that conduct does not violate the law. But
the phrase “in all lawful ways” could be given a meaning comparable to the
“compelling interest” used in Article II, Section 10.
The text of the 1972 Constitutional Convention sheds little light on
how the delegates interpreted “in all lawful ways,” because the phrase was
retained from the 1889 Montana Constitution.145 Several cases, however,
have interpreted this phrase. In State v. Gateway Mortuaries,146 the Court,
in striking down a statute, applied a standard of review similar to rational
basis, framing its question as follows:
The act rests upon an attempt to exercise the police power of the state. Does it
bear a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
some other phase of the general welfare?147

In a subsequent case, the Court, affirming the dismissal of a claim,
stressed that Article III, Section 3 of the 1889 Montana Constitution “prohibits the enactment of a law which would impair vested rights.”148 In State
v. Rathbone149 the Court tended toward a reading of the Declaration of
Rights as substantive but requiring something less than a compelling state
interest:
143. See e.g. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1244–1245; Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1171–1173.
144. Hawley v. Bd. of Oil and Gas Conserv., 993 P.2d 677, 679–680 (Mont. 2000).
145. Mont. Const. of 1889, art. III, § 3; see also Mont. Const. Conv. Procs., supra n. 136.
146. State v. Gateway Mortuaries, 287 P. 156 (Mont. 1930).
147. Id. at 157 (striking down a statute prohibiting burial contracts made before death by finding the
law to be an “unreasonable and arbitrary invasion upon the constitutional rights of the citizen.” Id. at
159.).
148. Young v. Bd. of Trustees of Broadwater Co. High Sch., 4 P.2d 725, 728 (Mont. 1931).
149. State v. Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1940).
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It is conceded that the construction to be given a right guaranteed to the individual by the Constitution must always be a reasonable one. The result of the
operation of the police power is necessarily in most instances an infringement
of private rights, but in the exercise of such power, property and individual
rights may be injured or impaired only to the extent reasonably necessary to
preserve the public welfare.150

The Court cited that language with approval in Garden Spot Market,
Inc. v. Byrne151 and characterized Article III, Section 3 of the 1889 Montana Constitution as “constitutional inhibitions upon the police power,”
again treating the Declaration of Rights as a substantive provision that limits the police power.152
Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution has generally been
treated as substantive. The Court’s interpretation of the phrase “in all lawful
ways,” however, has never been explicit and has tended to find a case-bycase balance between the need to protect the substantive rights of Article II,
Section 3 of the Montana Constitution, and the need to permit some exercise of the police power. The crucial question is how much police power is
to be permitted. Although the Court reserves wide discretion to itself to find
a balance between substantive rights and police power, its tendency has
been to apply strict scrutiny to infringements of Article II, Section 3.153
B. The plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to pursue employment and to seek
health were infringed, but their fundamental right to privacy was not.
As a result of the conclusion reached above, the analysis of whether
the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights were infringed will not consider the police
power of the State outside of the analysis of strict scrutiny review in Section
C below. The Court was incorrect to hold, as it did in Wiser and MCIA, that

150. Id. at 92 (emphasis added) (landowner’s conviction for killing an elk out of season in defense of
his property reversed).
151. Garden Spot Mkt., Inc. v. Byrne, 378 P.2d 220 (Mont. 1963).
152. Id. at 228 (a law requiring a license for the sale of coupons or “redeemable devices,” and
mandating an unreasonably high fee to obtain the license, violated Article III, Section 3 of the 1889
Montana Constitution).
153. Butte Comm. Union, 712 P.2d at 1312 (right to life’s basic necessities not infringed under
analysis of delegates’ intent at Montana Constitutional Convention, rational basis review applied); Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1174 (right to pursue employment infringed notwithstanding state police power, and
strict scrutiny applied); Kafka v. Hagener, 176 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1043 (“No fundamental right is implicated by banning fee killing of game farm animals . . . . To accept Plaintiffs’ argument would be the
equivalent of neutering the regulatory power of state government.”); Wiser, 129 P.3d at 139 (because
state has police power to regulate medical procedures, the right to pursue employment not infringed and
rational basis applied).
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the State’s police power can trump the effectiveness of an individual’s fundamental rights without the showing of a compelling state interest.154
1. Does the 2011 MMA infringe on medical marijuana Providers’ right
to pursue employment by prohibiting them from charging fees or
assisting more than three clients?
In previous decisions on the right to pursue employment, the Court
considered the following factors: (1) whether the law completely proscribes
an activity or leaves an individual “free to pursue” their employment in
general;155 (2) whether the individual is actually prohibited by the statute
from pursuing the basic necessities of life;156 and (3) whether the plaintiff’s
claim relies upon a claim of a property interest in a particular job.157
In MCIA the Court held that the Providers, “who are ultimately horticulturalists, remain free to pursue horticulture work generally.”158 Here,
the Court’s choice between a wide scope of “employment” (Providers are
horticulturalists) and a narrow scope (Providers are providers of medical
marijuana as defined in the 2011 MMA159) is likely outcome-determinative.
Because the Court selected the wide scope, offering no reasons for its
choice, it found that Providers “remain free” to pursue horticulture.160
The Court should have selected the narrow scope classification to follow its previous decisions. In Wadsworth and in Wiser, the plaintiffs’ specific professions were specifically regulated as professions by the State.161
Here, the role of Provider is specifically defined and regulated within the
154. The dissent in Abigail Alliance stresses, as does the analysis in this Note, that courts should be
careful to separate the analysis of whether a fundamental right exists from the analysis of the compelling
state interest. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 715–716.
155. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 139. In Wiser the Court held that denturists “remain free to pursue denture
work generally, and further, are not completely proscribed from performing partial denture work.” The
Wiser Court observed that in Wadsworth, the Court held the regulation prohibiting state appraisers from
moonlighting did in fact completely proscribe appraisers from “employment in their free time.” Id.
(citing Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1176).
156. In a special concurrence to Wadsworth, Justice Erdmann argued that the majority opinion “fails
to construe the meaning of ‘life’s basic necessities.’ In fact there was no discussion in the majority
opinion as to whether Wadsworth’s second job was needed in order for him to obtain these basic necessities.” Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1179 (Erdmann, J., specially concurring).
157. The Court has held many times that an individual “does not have a property interest in a particular job.” See Boreen v. Christensen, 884 P.2d 761, 770 (Mont. 1994); Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1173.
This question is not relevant to MCIA because medical marijuana providers are in essence independent
contractors providing a personal service and therefore do not claim a property interest in a particular
position with a particular employer.
158. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1166.
159. Mont. Code Ann. § 50–46–302(10) (2011).
160. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1166.
161. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1167–1168; Wiser, 129 P.3d at 136.
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2011 MMA.162 A Provider must register with the Department of Public
Health and Human Services; however, the 2011 MMA does not require that
a Provider have any background or expertise in horticulture.163 The 2004
MMA, by contrast, does not refer to Providers but to “caregivers,” who are
defined as individuals who have “agreed to undertake responsibility for
managing the well-being of a person with respect to the medical use of
marijuana.”164 The 2004 MMA includes no prohibition on caregivers charging fees for their services.165
Just as Wadsworth and Wiser involved restrictions on professions that
were defined and regulated by the State, MCIA involves a profession that
was defined and regulated by the State in the 2004 MMA and subsequently
prohibited by the 2011 MMA. Furthermore, because of the difficulty of
growing usable marijuana, the regulated profession of caregiver or Provider
is necessary in order to ensure the registered cardholders’ access to their
medication, especially for a person suffering from serious health issues.166
Although the Court had discretion to choose whether to frame the scope of
employment narrowly or broadly, it chose to frame the scope of employment narrowly in Wiser and Wadsworth and should have done so here as
well.
Because the better definition of medical marijuana Providers is the
narrow, statutory definition, the 2011 MMA infringed the right of Providers
to pursue employment. Therefore the State must show that the law was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
2. Does the 2011 MMA infringe registered cardholders’ right to seek
health by restricting their access to medical marijuana?
The Court has never fully analyzed the right to seek health under Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution.167 Under Wiser, individuals
have a right to obtain and reject medical treatment. In Wiser the Court could
have chosen to follow the Texas case Andrews, as the plaintiffs argued, by
162. Mont. Code Ann. § 50–46–302(10) (2011).
163. Id.
164. Mont. Code Ann. §50–46–102(1)(a) (2005).
165. Id. at §§ 50–46–101 to 210.
166. Appellee’s Response and Cross-App. Br., Mont. Cannabis Indus. Assn., 2012 WL 28772 at
22–24 (Mont. Jan. 17, 2012) (DA 11–0460).
167. In Wiser and Armstrong, the specific rights at issue involve the right to privacy. The majority
opinion in Armstrong briefly mentions that the Article II, Section 3 right to seek health is part of the
“overlapping and redundant rights” in the Montana Constitution. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383. Justice
Gray’s special concurrence to Armstrong sharply criticizes Justice Nelson’s majority opinion for including Article II, Section 3 and a host of other rights, all of which are “far beyond the scope of this case.”
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 384 (Gray, J., specially concurring). Because the bulk of Armstrong’s analysis is
directed at the right to privacy, it is not considered in detail here.
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holding that the right to seek health includes the right to “obtain medical
care from professionals who have not been determined by the regulating
authority to be qualified to provide the desired service.”168
In MCIA the plaintiffs argued: (1) the right to seek health is broad and
should include the right to access a legal drug; (2) the State cannot show a
compelling interest for restricting access to that drug;169 and (3) the effect
of the 2011 MMA is to substantially restrict access to medical marijuana
even beyond the ostensible purpose behind the 2011 MMA, which was to
counteract the Widespread Abuses.170
The State’s arguments and the Court’s arguments in its majority opinion belong under the compelling state interest analysis and not under the
right to seek health analysis. The Court cites Abigail Alliance and its litany
of supporting cases to argue that no court in another jurisdiction has held
that individuals have a “fundamental right to use any drug, regardless of its
legality.”171 However, the current legal status of a drug or treatment has no
place in the analysis of a fundamental right; otherwise, anything currently
outlawed by a statute, no matter how unjust the prohibition, would be held
outside the fundamental right. The current legal status of a medical treatment, and the legislature’s purpose behind regulating a medical treatment,
belong in the analysis of compelling state interest.
The plaintiffs in this case are correct to argue that the 2011 MMA
infringes their right to seek health by unconstitutionally restricting their access to the drug of their choice, making it difficult or impossible to obtain
marijuana.172 Further, the State made no argument that the right to seek
health was not infringed by restricting registered cardholders’ access to marijuana. Therefore, the Court should have found the plaintiffs’ fundamental
right to seek health was infringed by the provisions of the 2011 MMA that
restrict plaintiffs’ access to marijuana. However, this is not to say that there
was an infringement of any affirmative right of access to marijuana. The
plaintiffs in MCIA did not argue that they have an affirmative right of access under the Montana Constitution; rather, the plaintiffs made the less
ambitious argument that the 2011 MMA was unconstitutionally restricting
their access to a legal medicine.173
168. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 137 (citing Andrews, 498 F.Supp. at 1055–1057).
169. Appellee’s Response and Cross-App. Br., supra n. 166, at 28–32.
170. Id. The plaintiffs argue that the Widespread Abuses are “exaggerated.” Id. at 5.
171. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1166 (citing Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 695 n. 18).
172. Appellee’s Response and Cross-App. Br., supra n. 167, at 28–32.
173. Id. at 20–36. If the plaintiffs were to argue for a fundamental right to use marijuana regardless
of its legality, it would be an issue of first impression in Montana, and the Court might follow an
analysis similar to the analysis of the right to privacy in Section V.B.3., infra; alternately, the Court
might follow the line of cases from other jurisdictions cited in Abigail Alliance in denying plaintiffs’
claim. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 695 n. 18.
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3. Does the 2011 MMA infringe on registered cardholders’ right to
privacy by placing restrictions on their access to medical
marijuana?
Unlike the right to seek health, the right to privacy under Article II,
Section 10 of the Montana Constitution has been litigated, and analyzed in
detail, a number of times.174 There are a number of components to the right
to privacy, including the right to be free from warrantless search and
seizure175 and the informational right to privacy.176 The relevant aspect of
the right to privacy here is the personal autonomy component.
The Court has adopted the test from Palko v. Connecticut177 in its
analysis of the personal autonomy component of the right to privacy.178 In
Palko the United States Supreme Court asked the following question to
determine the constitutionality of a statute: “Does it violate those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions?”179 The notion of what is or is not fundamental is
described by analogy in Griswold v. Connecticut:180
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband
and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.181

Courts will first review whether there is a “careful description of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest,” and if there is a sufficiently careful
description, courts will then ask whether the fundamental right is found to
be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”182
In Raich v. Gonzales,183 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution “embraces a right to make
a life-shaping decision on a physician’s advice to use medical marijuana to
174. See generally Town of Ennis v. Stewart, 807 P.2d 179 (Mont. 1991); Gryczan, 942 P.2d 112;
Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364; Wiser, 129 P.3d 133.
175. E.g. State v. Ellis, 210 P.3d 144 (Mont. 2009).
176. E.g. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 122.
177. Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled, Benton v. Md., 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
178. Id. at 328.
179. Id. (citation omitted) (For the application of the Palko test by the Montana Supreme Court, see
Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 122–123.).
180. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
181. Id. at 482.
182. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–721 (1997) (internal citations omitted). The
United States Supreme Court, Rehnquist, C.J., applied rational basis review to Washington’s statute
prohibiting assisted suicide and upheld the statute: “That many of the rights and liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any
and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.” Id. at 727 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
183. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007).
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preserve bodily integrity, avoid intolerable pain, and preserve life, when all
other prescribed medications and remedies have failed.”184 The court concluded that, despite the “rising number” of states to permit medical marijuana, “the use of medical marijuana has not obtained the degree of recognition today that private sexual conduct had obtained by 2004 in Lawrence.”185 The court in Raich acknowledged “that day may be upon us
sooner than expected.”186
In Gryczan, the Court held that adults engaging in consensual, noncommercial sex is a type of interest “sufficient to invoke the special protections of a privacy right.”187 The Court observed that “it is hard to imagine
any activity that adults would consider more fundamental, more private,
and, thus, more deserving of protection from governmental interference
than non-commercial, consensual adult sexual activity.”188
In Armstrong the Court held that “decisions affecting marriage and
childbirth are so intimate and personal that people must in principle be
allowed to make these decisions for themselves, consulting their own preferences and convictions, rather than having society impose its collective
decision upon them.”189 Armstrong further extended the holding of Gryczan
into the sphere of medical decisions, stating that “[j]ust as the government
has no business in the bedrooms of consenting adults, . . . neither does it
have any business in the treatment rooms of their health care providers.”190
If the Palko standard had been applied to the present case, the Court
would likely have concluded no fundamental right exists for a medical marijuana patient to “make medical judgments affecting his or her bodily integrity and health in partnership with a chosen health care provider,”191
because the right to privacy in choosing a specific medication in partnership
with a physician, regardless of the legality of the drug, is not so deeplyrooted in American history and tradition. American society in general has
been increasingly receptive to the relaxation of marijuana laws;192 however,
it remains difficult to argue that a law regulating the right to access medical
184. Id. at 864 (on remand from U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
the Ninth Circuit considered Raich’s common-law and constitutional claims that she had a right to use
medical marijuana and affirmed the denial of her claims).
185. Id. at 864–865 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
186. Id. at 865.
187. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 123.
188. Id.
189. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 377 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 380 (citation omitted).
191. Id. at 370.
192. See e.g. Procon.org, Votes and Polls, 2000–Present, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.
additional-resource.php?resourceID=149 (last updated June 10, 2013) (Numerous polls show substantial
support in recent years for medical marijuana for patients with certain specific health conditions. Most
of the polls indicate not just majority support but supermajority support.).
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marijuana violates a fundamental principle of liberty and justice lying at the
base of all our civil and political institutions.193 Medical marijuana is not as
deeply-rooted as the choice of consenting sexual partners, as in Gryczan; or
choices related to childbearing, as in Armstrong. Medical marijuana is not
“so intimate and personal” that people must be allowed to act upon their
own convictions in consultation with medical professionals without state
interference.194
There is, however, significant evidence of a softening of views toward
marijuana. The Obama Administration has hinted at a program of non-enforcement.195 Twenty states have legalized medical marijuana, two states
have legalized marijuana altogether, and four other states have legislation
pending to legalize medical marijuana.196 Furthermore, an analysis under
the Palko test probably should not dwell too much on the existence of opposition to a particular hot-button issue. Otherwise no court would have found
that state laws restricting abortions, as in Armstrong, were unconstitutional.197
Less than two months after the Court’s decision in MCIA was released
in September 2012, Montanans voted on a statewide ballot initiative asking
whether the 2011 MMA should be allowed to take effect, or whether it
should be scrapped in favor of the previous law.198 Montana voters chose
the more restrictive 2011 MMA by a margin of about fifteen percentage
points.199 This ballot result does not necessarily reflect Montanans’ specific
opinions about marijuana as a fundamental right; it might speak more directly to Montanans’ belief that the State had a compelling interest in curtailing the Widespread Abuses.
It is therefore a close call whether the plaintiffs in MCIA could show
that their personal autonomy interest in the right to privacy was infringed
by the 2011 MMA. American society as a whole appears to be more accepting of medical marijuana now than it was in 2007 when Raich v. Gonzales was decided.200 However, although the case has a number of similarities to Armstrong, the fact remains that the right to abortion is a more fundamental right in American society than the right to access medical
193. Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.
194. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 377. Not only has marijuana been illegal for most of the last eight
decades, and Americans in support of tougher sentencing for drug crimes, but marijuana use has been
associated throughout American history with the counterculture and with marginalized individuals.
195. James M. Cole, supra n. 38.
196. Procon.org, 20 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C., supra n. 32.
197. Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
198. Montana Secretary of State, 2012 Statewide General Election Canvass, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/2012/2012_General_Canvass.pdf, 27 (accessed October 17, 2013).
199. Id.
200. Raich, 500 F.3d at 865.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2014

25

Montana Law Review, Vol. 75 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 7
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\75-1\MON105.txt

192

unknown

Seq: 26

7-FEB-14

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

12:39

Vol. 75

marijuana. It is likely the Palko standard has not yet been satisfied for medical marijuana. The Court was correct to conclude that the right to privacy
standing on its own is not implicated by the 2011 MMA. In the future,
courts might hold that restricting access to medical marijuana, perhaps even
recreational marijuana, violates fundamental principles of liberty and justice. But it does not appear that society has reached that acceptance just yet.
C. Does the 2011 MMA survive strict scrutiny review?
When the Court applies strict scrutiny review, the State “has the burden of showing that the law . . . is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.”201 The two elements of strict scrutiny—that the law
be narrowly tailored and that it serve a compelling interest—are conjunctive
and must both be satisfied in order for the law to pass constitutional muster.
1. Can the State show a compelling government interest?
The Court has been reluctant to find compelling state interests in a
number of recent cases. In Gryczan, the State attempted to argue that its
interests in “containing the spread of AIDS” and “protecting public morals”
were compelling state interests.202 The Court disagreed.203 The Court in
Wadsworth concluded that the State failed to demonstrate a compelling interest because the State failed to present evidence showing the existence of
a compelling interest.204 The Court was not persuaded by the State’s evidence that the Department of Revenue’s rule limiting outside employment
was to avoid the “appearance of impropriety.”205 In Armstrong, the Court
found “there is simply no evidence to support the contention that this practice by [plaintiffs] Cahill and Armstrong in any way endangers women’s
health.”206 Courts in other jurisdictions have previously held that there is
not a fundamental right to use a drug regardless of its legality and that an
individual’s choice of medication is within the government’s interest in protecting health.207
201. Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 450 (internal citation omitted).
202. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 123–124.
203. Id. at 124–126.
204. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1174–1175 (“Necessarily, demonstrating a compelling interest entails
something more than simply saying it is so.”).
205. Id. at 1174. Because no evidence was presented that the conduct of any Department of Revenue
employees had ever threatened the appearance of impropriety, the purpose behind the rule had little
value; thus, the State could not show a compelling interest.
206. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 381 (quoting the trial court’s finding).
207. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d 695; Privitera, 591 P.2d 919; Rutherford v. U.S., 442 U.S. 544
(1979); Co. of Santa Cruz, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192. Perhaps courts’ rejection of constitutional “affirmative
access” claims arise from the thought that, if affirmative access to medicine is a fundamental right,
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Under the Armstrong standard, where the State must put on evidence
to show the compelling interest, in MCIA the State did present evidence
regarding the Widespread Abuses.208 The State considered the Widespread
Abuses sufficient to constitute a compelling state interest because it did not
attempt to make other claims about the potential harm involving marijuana:
for instance, that marijuana is a “gateway drug” that leads youth to more
harmful drugs; that the act of smoking marijuana is harmful; that the science showing health benefits from marijuana is dubious; that marijuana
“sends the wrong message to our children”; that medical marijuana leads to
more children aged twelve to seventeen using marijuana; and that other
treatments are adequate.209 Rather, the State pointed to large-scale grow
operations; healthy young folk smoking marijuana openly after obtaining a
medical marijuana card merely by claiming chronic pain; caregivers raking
in enormous fees and shamelessly advertising their product.210 Instead of
arguing marijuana is harmful, the State argued the 2004 MMA permitted
widespread recreational marijuana use because its provisions were so lax.211
The plaintiffs make two primary arguments that the Widespread Abuses are
not sufficiently serious: first, marijuana has positive effects on the health of
many users; and second, there are so few proven health problems associated
with marijuana that no reason exists why higher numbers of people using it
should constitute a compelling interest.212
This note will not attempt to analyze the thorny issue of whether marijuana actually improves a person’s health as medicine does, impairs a person as alcohol does, or addicts a person like methamphetamine.213 Because
the portions of the 2011 MMA at issue in MCIA were not narrowly tailored,
there is no need to further analyze whether marijuana is harmful enough to

patients and doctors consulting together might agree that the patient should be prescribed, for instance,
methamphetamine regardless of its legality.
208. Br. of Appellant, supra n. 41, at 4–5.
209. Barry McCaffrey, “Statement by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy,”
reprinted in Musto, supra n. 8, at 534–539.

R

210. Br. of Appellant, supra n. 41, at 4–5.
211. Id.
212. Appellees’ Response and Cross-App. Br., supra n. 67, at 3–7. The weakness of the State’s
argument is seen by analogy to the over-the-counter painkiller Motrin: the State is not alarmed if high
numbers of Montanans who don’t need it ingest Motrin. Therefore, unless marijuana is more harmful to
the public health than Motrin, the State can show no compelling interest.
213. The issue of the health benefits and/or harm related to marijuana has been widely debated;
however, a great deal of that writing is one-sided and biased either in favor of or against marijuana. See
Isralowitz & Meyers, supra n. 7, at 18–19. For a scholarly overview of the subject that presents many
relevant primary documents, see Musto, supra n. 8.
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justify the State in passing the 2011 MMA. The State cannot show that the
2011 MMA served a compelling government interest.214
2. Is the 2011 MMA narrowly tailored to serve the government
interest?
The State does not have a strong argument that the 2011 MMA is
narrowly tailored. The State’s purpose behind the limitations on cultivation
and on the activity of Providers was to stop the Widespread Abuses. The
express purposes of the 2011 MMA are to “allow for the limited cultivation
. . . of marijuana” and to “allow individuals to assist a limited number of
registered cardholders.”215 However, this might have been accomplished
through the simple act of redefining “chronic pain” narrowly enough to
prevent tens of thousands of healthy Montanans from claiming chronic
pain.216 Further, since the 2011 MMA prevents Providers from charging
fees for their services,217 it is difficult to understand why the law also needs
to restrict Providers from assisting more than three patients at a time, or
vice versa. Therefore, the 2011 MMA cannot reasonably be understood as a
statute that has been narrowly tailored to serve the State’s compelling interest. The portions of the 2011 MMA that were at issue in MCIA should have
been held unconstitutional by the Court.
D. MCIA presented a justiciable controversy.
Although neither party raised the issue of justiciability in MCIA, Justice Nelson analyzed it in his dissent and concluded that the case should
have been dismissed.218 Justice Nelson’s dissent is incorrect in its claim that
the “question whether plaintiffs’ use, possession, or distribution of marijuana is in compliance with Montana law involves a purely academic (and
therefore nonjusticiable) determination.”219 Courts analyze whether a controversy is “adverse” based upon how vigorously the parties litigate it: “The
presence of unmistakable concreteness and vigorous adversary argument in
a dispute can be enough to avoid an advisory opinion problem even when
214. Indeed, at no point did the State even argue that the 2011 MMA might survive strict scrutiny
review. The State’s arguments all hinged on the need for the Court to find that rational basis review was
appropriate. See e.g. Br. of Appellant, supra n. 41, at 16.
215. Mont. Code Ann. § 50–46–301(2)(b) to (c) (emphasis added).
216. The 2004 MMA did not define chronic pain, while the 2011 MMA does define it and requires
“objective proof” of the chronic pain. Mont. Code Ann. § 50–46–302(2)(c) (2011).
217. Id. at § 50–46–308(4), (6).
218. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1171–1172 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 1170 (citation omitted). A case is only justiciable if it is “definite and concrete, touching
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Id. at 1169 (citing Reichert v. State ex rel.
McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455, 471 (Mont. 2012)).
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the nominal parties to the lawsuit agree with each other on legal issues.”220
The specific doctrine of justiciability at issue in MCIA is whether the plaintiffs are seeking an advisory opinion, defined as “an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts, or upon an abstract
proposition.”221
Here, there is a significant presence of concreteness and adversary argument, and neither party seeks an opinion upon hypothetical facts. Several
plaintiffs are caregivers under the 2004 MMA and would be barred from
pursuing their profession under the 2011 MMA. Other plaintiffs are registered cardholders and would be unable to obtain marijuana under the 2011
MMA due to restrictions on caregivers. The State’s interest is concrete because it has a direct stake in preventing the Widespread Abuses. Further,
the issue is not hypothetical because, after passage of the 2011 MMA, state
law enforcement will have the authority to enforce the limitations on providers assisting more than three clients and charging fees.
Justice Nelson’s argument that MCIA is nonjusticiable relies upon his
argument that the federal CSA preempts state law on marijuana.222 If the
federal CSA does not preempt the 2011 MMA, then the present case meets
all requirements of a case or controversy. Under the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.”223 Preemption by federal agencies is increasingly seen as the accepted norm, and express anti-preemption provisions in federal laws are the
exceptional rarity.224 When the federal courts determine whether a state law
has been preempted by a federal law, the primary inquiry is into the intent
behind the federal law.225
The preemption doctrine has been refined into a number of different
categories.226 The type of preemption relevant to MCIA is “physical impossibility” conflict preemption.227 Under this concept, a state law may be
struck down if it is in “actual conflict” with precise and sufficiently narrow
220. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, Third Edition, Vol. 1, 329 (2000) (citing INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
221. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1169 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Reichert, 278 P.3d at 471).
222. Id. at 1170–71.
223. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
224. James T. O’Reilly, Federal Preemption of State and Local Law: Legislation, Regulation and
Litigation 36 (American Bar Association 2006) (citing Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in
Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 967 (2002)).
225. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); AGG Enter. v. Washington Co., 281 F.3d 1324,
1329 (9th Cir. 2002) (The Court will consider “what Congress intended in its statute and at most with
what Congress thought” the statute would accomplish. AGG Enter., 281 F.3d at 1329).
226. O’Reilly, supra n. 224, at 72.
227. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1170 (Nelson, J., dissenting). For a description of physical impossibility conflict preemption, see Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–143
(1963).
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objectives that underlie the federal enactments or if regulatory objectives of
the two governments are incompatible.228
In the present case, the federal courts are not likely to conclude that the
CSA preempts state laws such as the 2011 MMA. First, the CSA has long
been held in a number of contexts not to have preempted state law.229 Second, the CSA includes the following clause to limit the CSA’s preemption
of state law only to cases of physical impossibility:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates,
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same
subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State,
unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter
and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.230

Under one exceedingly literal interpretation, there is no positive conflict in complying with the 2011 MMA and the CSA, because the 2011
MMA does not affirmatively require Montanans to obtain a medical marijuana card and use a controlled substance.231 Justice Nelson’s dissent in
MCIA argued that the physical impossibility exception does apply because
it is clear the plaintiffs intend to continue using marijuana in violation of the
CSA.232 There is a physical impossibility, Justice Nelson argues, in obeying
the CSA, which criminalizes marijuana use or possession and states marijuana has no known medical use; while simultaneously complying with the
2011 MMA, which asserts marijuana may be used for medical purposes.233
Even more than the abstract issue of physical impossibility, there remains the very real fact the State has more law enforcement resources in
Montana than the federal government does. The State prosecutes more drug
violations in Montana than does federal law enforcement. Neither the 2004
MMA nor the 2011 MMA provides medical marijuana providers or registered cardholders with an affirmative defense in the event of a federal pros228. O’Reilly, supra n. 224, at 72 (citing Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminals, 411 U.S. 624 (1973)).
229. Gonzales v. Or., 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (Under the CSA, federal law enforcement may not prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, as authorized by
state law.); Cal. v. Gard, 143 Cal. Rptr. 346, 347–348 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1978) (CSA has not preempted state laws regarding sales of controlled substances by a physician to another physician.); Nichols
v. Bd. of Pharm, 657 P.2d 216, 219 (Or. App. 1983) (Oregon law prohibiting pharmacists from dispensing controlled substances based on prescription written by a doctor not registered in Oregon was not in
“positive conflict” with the CSA). For a leading case that upholds the constitutionality of the CSA, see
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (federal government’s authority upheld under the Commerce Clause to
regulate medical marijuana).
230. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (emphasis added).
231. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 590 for an example of this type of reasoning.
232. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1170 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Justice Nelson himself raised the
issue of preemption, because neither the plaintiffs nor the State wished to argue that the CSA might
preempt the 2011 MMA. Id. at 1171.
233. Id. at 1170.
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ecution under the CSA. However, federal prosecution remains unlikely to
occur on a wide scale due to limited federal resources. As a result, the state
law is relevant to registered cardholders and providers, and a challenge to
the 2011 MMA does have the character of concreteness and adversary argument.
It is not easy to predict how a state court would rule if, for instance,
state law enforcement were to attempt to apply the CSA to prosecute a
Montana citizen who possessed marijuana in full compliance with the 2011
MMA. Furthermore, today’s United States Supreme Court, tending to favor
state rights over sweeping federal programs, has been slow to find federal
preemption of state laws.234 Given the current composition of the United
States Supreme Court and its recent tendency to uphold state laws,235 it
appears more likely than not that a federal court could “reconcile the operation of both statutory schemes”236 and uphold the 2011 MMA. Thus, Justice
Nelson was mistaken in his claim that the Court should have dismissed the
case because the CSA preempted the 2011 MMA.237
V.

CONCLUSION

The 2011 MMA was “foolish legislation”238 for using draconian measures to solve the Widespread Abuses. The Court’s decision in MCIA is
troubling in that it could allow for substantial exercise of the State’s police
power to regulate for the public health and safety without the statute being
subject to strict scrutiny analysis. The Court was wrong to respond to the
Widespread Abuses by holding that the state’s police power can trump the
fundamental rights protected by the Montana Constitution. In the immediate
234. In several recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that state laws were not
preempted. E.g. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (Federal law regulating
insecticides did not preempt state law. The Court indicated that “we have long presumed that Congress
does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action. In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume
that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and
manifest.” (citations omitted)); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (federal cigarettelabeling law did not preempt state law on unfair trade practices).
235. See Bates, 544 U.S. 431; Altria Group, Inc., 555 U.S. 70; and Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 for recent
examples of the U.S. Supreme Court finding a state law not preempted. However, for recent examples of
the U.S. Supreme Court holding that a federal law had preempted a state law, see Am. Ins. Assn. v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (state law requiring insurance disclosure if insurer sold Holocaust-era
policies in Europe preempted because the President has broad powers to conduct foreign affairs without
state interference); Ariz. v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 (portions of state law regulating
unauthorized aliens preempted by federal immigration law because the state law “pursued policies that
undermine federal law”); and Hillman v. Maretta, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013) (federal
life insurance act preempts Virginia law because the state law “interferes with Congress’ objective that
insurance proceeds belong to the named beneficiary”).
236. Merrill Lynch, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (citation omitted).
237. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1170 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
238. Ralph Waldo Emerson, supra n. 1, at 248.
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future, after the Court’s decision in MCIA and then a referendum upholding
the 2011 MMA and then a district court enjoining portions of the 2011
MMA on remand, it is unclear what the law regarding medical marijuana
actually is in Montana.
The moment has not yet arrived when access to medical marijuana is
protected as a basic principle of justice and fairness. However, with more
states legalizing medical marijuana; with Americans gradually coming to
accept the legitimacy of medical marijuana; and given the possibility that
marijuana advocates will succeed one day in re-scheduling marijuana under
the CSA, the moment of marijuana’s acceptance will likely occur at some
point in the near future.
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